








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Herings, P. J. J. (1995). On the representation of admissible rationing schemes by rationing functions.
(Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics; Vol. FEW 692). Unknown Publisher.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







II III I IIIII IAlll IV N II I III II n ll l Inll VI I III













Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
On the Representation of
Admissible Rationing Schemes by
Rationing F'unctions ~ ~









IThe author would like to thank Dolf Talman for his valuable comments on previous drafts of this
paper.
4This research is part of the VF-program "Competition and Cooperation".
'The author is financially supported by the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven Universities,
The Netherlands
Abstract
In the literature on general equilibrium models with price rigidities and rationing, usually
not all rationing schemes are allowed. Examples given in the literature concern uniform
rationing, proportional rationing, rationing determined by market share, or rationing de-
termined by priority. The rationing system specifies all admissible rationing schemes. In
the literature it is usually assumed that the rationing system can be specified by means
of a rationing function. In this paper necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the
representation of the rationing system by means of a rationing function.
1 Introduction
In the literature concerning general equilibrium models with price rigidities and rationing, it
is assumed that the market mechanism specifies the price system and the rationing scheme
of every consumer. The rationing scheme determines the maximal amount a consumer
is allowed to supply and to demand of every commodity. However, in general not all
rationing schemes are generated by the market mechanism in the economy. Sometimes
rationing schemes are required to be uniform for all consumers, sometimes they depend on
the amount of initial endowments owned by the various consumers, in other cases they are
determined according to some priority system. The rationing system is defined as the set of
all admissible rationing schemes. Usually, the rationing system is modelled in the literature
as being the range of a so-called rationing function. Very general specifications of rationing
functions have been given for instance in Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978), Weddepohl
(1987), Herings (1992), and Movshovich (1994). Modelling the set of admissible rationing
schemes by means of the range of a rationing function is usually much more difficult than
directly specifying the set of admissible rationing schemes, but is much easier when giving
a proof of the existence of an equilibrium. Therefore, necessary and suffiicient conditions
are given in this paper for the representation of a rationing system by means of a rationing
function.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some examples of rationing systems
frequently used in the literature are described by specifying directly the set of admissible
rationing schemes. This shows the convenience of this approach to model the rationing
schemes allowed in the economy. Furthermore, some interesting properties of rationing
systems are given, like flexibility, market independence, connectedness, closedness, weak
monotonicity, and monotonicity. Moreover, it is specified when two rationing schemes
should be considered as being equivalent. In Section 3 the same examples as given in
Section 2 are treated, but now the set of admissible rationing schemes is specified as being
the range of a rationing function. Furthermore, some interesting properties of rationing
functions are given, like flexibility, market independence, continuity, weak monotonicity,
and monotonicity. Finally, in Section 4 some representation results are given, specifying
necessary and sufficient conditions for representing rationing systems by means of rationing
functions.
2 Rationing Systems
In the following, for k E N, define Ik -{ 1, ..., k}, Qk -{q E Rk ~ 0 C q~ G 1, Hj E Ik }, let
Ok be a k-dimensional vector of zeroes, let lk be a k-dimensional vector of ones, let -ook be
a k-dimensional vector with every component equal to -oo, and let ook be a k-dimensional
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vector with every component equal to foo. The set of extended real numbers is denoted
by R' and the k-dimensional Cartesian product of this set by R'k. If x', a~ E R'k, then
x' G x2 means x~ G x~, yj E Ik, x' G x2 means x' G x2 and there exists j E Ik such that
x~ G x~, and x1 GG x~ means x~ G x~, b'j E Ik. Similarly, ~,1, and ~~ are defined. The set
{x E R'k ~ x~ Ok} is denoted by R~ and the set {x E R'k ~ x~) Ok} is denoted by R}f.
The sets R~ and Rt~ are defined similarly.
An exchange economy with price rigidities is defined by E-((X', ~`,w')iEIM, P). There
is a finite number of consumers, say M, indexed by i E I,y, and a finite number of com-
modities, say N, indexed by j E IN. For every i E I,y, consumer i is characterized by
a consumption set X` C RN, a preference ordering ~` on X', and an initial endowment
w' E R'v. The set of admissible price systems is denoted by P. The total initial endow-
ments, denoted by w, are defined by w -~,EIM w'. Given consumption sets X', `di E Imr,
the set j~j;E~M X' is denoted by X, and if x-(xl, ..., x'~) is an element of X, then
x; -(x~ , xM)r tlj E IN. Given initial endowments w', tli E I1N, w-(wi, ,wM) and
w; - (w~,...,wM)T, `d~ E I~r.
The set of admissible price systems may exclude every Walrasian equilibrium price
system, so it is possible that at every p E P supply is not equal to demand. Therefore,
following Drèze (1975), the description of the market mechanism has to be extended in
the sense that the information transmitted by the market mechanism is not only the price
system, but also the maximal amount a consumer is allowed to supply of every commodity,
called the rationing scheme on supply, and the maximal amount a consumer is allowed
to demand of every commodity, called the rationing scheme on demand. The rationing
scheme on supply is denoted by I- (l', ..., lM) E n;E~M -~}~ and the rationing scheme on
demand by L- (L1, ..., LM) E j-j;EIM R't . The pair (1, L) is called the rationing scheme.
For every consumer i E I,y, l` is called the rationing scheme on the supply of consumer
i, L' is called the rationing scheme on the demand of consumer i, and the pair (I`, L`) is
called the rationing scheme of consumer i. For every j E IN, 1~ -(1~, ...,1M)T is called the
rationing scheme on supply on the market of commodity j E 1~,, L; -(L~, ..., LM )T is
called the rationing scheme on demand on the market of commodity j, and the pair (l;, L;)
is called the rationing scheme on the market of commodity j.
For every consumer i E I,y, define the budget set of consumer i at a price system
p E P and a rationing scheme (l`, L') E-R't x R"t , denoted by Q`(p, l', L'), as the set
of consumption bundles in the consumption set of consumer i satisfying the constraints
imposed by the rationing scheme of consumer i and being such that the value of these
consumption bundles does not exceed p. w`, so
Q'(P,1',L')-{x`EX'IP'x'Gp.w` and l'Gx'-w'GL`}.
Notice that the requirement that 1' E -R't and L' E R'~ implies that only voluntary
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trading takes place. No consumer can be forced to supply or to demand at least a certain
amount of a commodity. In case 1' - -ooN and L' -~ooN the definition of the budget
set is equal to the usual one. Therefore, the description of the market mechanism given
here is more general than the usual description.
The description of the economic system is extended in this section by the specification of
a set of admissible rationing schemes, called the rationing system. The rationing system is
given by the pair of sets (l, L), where ! C-}g`MN and L C 1R'MN, specifying all admissible
rationing schemes. The set l, called the rationing system on supply, specifies all admissible
rationing schemes on supply and the set L, called the rationing system on demand, specifies
all admissible rationing schemes on demand. The market mechanism is assumed to specify
a price system p E P and a rationing scheme (l, L) E l x L.
A consumer i E I~y is assumed to take the price system p E P and the rationing scheme
(l', Li) E -R't x JR'~ as given, and to choose a best element of Qi(p, l`, L') for ~i . Define,
for every consumer i E I~y, for every (p, li, Li) E P x-R'~ x R't , the set bi(p, l', Li) as
the set of consumption bundles being best elements of p'(p, li, L') for ~', i.e.,
b~(P,!',L')-{x EQ'(P,l',L')Ix ~'a', `dx'EQ`(P,li,Li)}.
The following definition of a constrained equilibrium generalizes the definitions used in the
literature.
Definition 2.1 (Constrained equilibrium)
A constrained equilibrium of the economy E' -((X', ~',w`);E~,,,, P, (l, L)) is an element
(P~,I~,L~,~~)EPxixixx
satísfying
1. for every consumer i E I~y, x" E b`(p', l", L"),
i i N
~. ~iElnq ~~ - ~íE1M w - ~ ~
,~. for every commodity j E IN, x~' - w~ - l~' for some consumer i' E I,y implies
.c~i - w~ C L~', di E I~y, and ~~i~ - w~~ - L~i' for some consumer i' E I~y implies
~~' - w~ 1 IÍ', Hi E I,M.
:~loreover, some additional requirements are usually specified in the literature, like the
assumption that there is no rationing on the market of a numeraire commodity and the
exclusion of certain combinations of rationing schemes and price systems. For instance,
demand rationing on a market is usually not allowed if it is possible to raise the price on
this market. For a discussion of the equilibrium concept given above, the reader is referred
to Drèze (1975).
Now some examples of rationing systems are given.
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Example 2.2 (Unrestricted rationing system)
In the unrestricted rationing system every rationing scheme is allowed. The unrestricted
rationing system on supply is defined by
The unrestricted rationing system on demand is defined by
L-R'MN
Example 2.3 (Uniform rationing system)
The uniform rationing system is used in Drèze (1975). The uniform rationing system on
supply is defined by
~ - {i E -IR~MN
~1 - . . . - (M 1 ,t J
The uniform rationing system on demand is defined by
L-{LEII~.'MNIL'-" -LM}.
Example 2.4 (Proportional rationing system)
The proportional rationing system is used in Kurz (1982). Assume that w~ ) 0, t1i E IM,
dj E I,v. The proportional rationing system on supply is defined by
l-{l E -1R`MN b'j E IN, ~ 1~ E 1R~, tli E I.tit, 1`~ --,~~w~ }.
The proportional rationing system on demand is defined by
L-{L E 1R'MN `dj E I,v, ~~~ E 1R~, di E IM, L'~ - a~w~ }.
Example 2.5 (Market share rationing system)
The market share rationing system is used in Weddepohl (1983). For every j E I,v, let
numbers á~ 1 0, tli E I;y, be given such that ~;EiM á~ - 1. The market share rationing
system on supply with respect to a-(ai, ..., aN)T is defined by
1-{l E-R'MN I~1j E Inr, ~~~ E)R,t, di E IM, l~ --~~a~ }.
For every j E IN, let numbers á~ ~ 0, di E IM, be given such that ~;EIM áj - 1. The
market share rationing system on demand with respect to á- (iYi, . .., áN )T is defined by
L-{LEIR'MN `d~EIN, 3~,EffIt, `d2E1M, L'~-aj~j}.
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Example 2.6 (Priority rationing system)
Among other rationing systems, the priority rationing system is considered in Weddepohl
(1987). For every j E I~,, let ~~ : I,y -~ I~y be a permutation specifying the order in
which consumers are rationed on their supply on the market of commodity j, so, for every
k E I~y, if consumer ~r~(k) is rationed on his supply on the market of of commodity j,
then the consumers ~r~(1),...,~r~(k - 1) are fully rationed on their supply. The priority
rationing system on supply with respect to a-(~, ...,~) is defined by
1- {i E
-R,MN `dk E I,~.r `{1}, d~ E IN, l~ Ikl )-oo ~ l~ ]k-'1 - 0,
b'k E liy-i, d1 E I,v, l~ Ikl c 0~ l~
~kfl) --~l .
For every j E IN, let ir~ : I,y -~ I~y be a permutation specifying the orlder in which
consumers are rationed on their demand on the market of commodity j, so, for every
k E I~y, if consumer ir~(k) is rationed on his demand on the market of commodity j,
then the consumers ir~ (1), ... , ir~ (k - 1) are fully rationed on their demand. The priority
rationing system on demand with respect to ~r -(~rl, ...,~rN) is defined by
L-{L E R`MN dk E In~ `{1}, `d~ E IN, L~'Ikl G~oo ~ L~'(k-') - 0,
dk E IM-,, dj E IN, L~'~k~ 1 0~
L~,(kti) --f-oo} .
The following assumptions are often made with respect to the rationing system (l, L).
- No rationing on supply is admissible, i.e., -ooMN E l, no rationing on demand is admis-
sible, i.e., ~-oo'~N E L, full rationing on supply is admissible, i.e., 0`tiN E 1, and full
rationing on demand is admissible, i.e., OMN E L. The rationing system on supply
is flexible, i.e., {-oo`~N,OMN} C l. The rationing system on demand is flexible, i.e.,
{OM'v ~oo`'~N} C L. The rationing system is flexible, i.e., both the rationing system
on supply and the rationing system on demand is flexible. Notice that the rationing
systems of Example 2.2, Example 2.3, Example 2.4, Example 2.5, and Example 2.6
are all flexible.
- The rationing system on supply is market independent, i.e., there exist subsets 1„ tlj E
I,v, of -Rt~ such that 1 E 1 if and only if h E 1„ b'j E IN. The rationing system on
demand is market independent, i.e., there exist subsets LJ, tlj E IN, of R`M such that
L E L if and only if L~ E L„ flj E IN. The rationing system is market independent,
i.e., both the rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand is
market independent: Notice that the rationing systems of Example 2.2, Example
2.3, Example 2.4, Example 2.5, and Example 2.6 are all market independent.
- The rationing system on supply is connected, i.e., the set 1 is connected in -R'MN,
the rationing system on demand is connected, i.e., the set L is connected in R'MN
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The rationing system is connected, i.e., both the rationing system on supply and
the rationing system on demand is connected. Notice that the rationing systems
of Example 2.2, Example 2.3, Example 2.4, Example 2.5, and Example 2.6 are all
connected.
- The rationing system on supply is closed, i.e., the set 1 is closed in -RMN, the rationing
system on demand is closed, i.e., the set L is closed in RMN. The rationing system is
closed, i.e., both the rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand
is closed. Notice that the rationing systems of Example 2.2, Example 2.3, Example
2.4, Example 2.5, and Example 2.6 are all closed.
- For every rationing scheme on supply ! E l, for every commodity j E I.v, let the set
1~~(1) be defined by 1~ ~(!) -{i E I,y ~ l'j -- oo} and let the integer i~~(1) be
defined by i~~(1) -~1~~(1). The rationing system on supply is weakly monotonic,
i.e., if l, l E l, then, for every j E I~r, lj -!j, or 1~~(l) - I~~(!) and ~;EIM`I~W(i) l~ ~
~;EtM`t~ w(i) li, or h~(Í) is a proper subset of h~(1), or h~(l) is a proper subset
of I~~(1). Moreover, some limit property is needed for weak monotonicity. Let
((1)n)nEN be a sequence in 1 converging to some 1 E l, where, for every j E Inr, for
every n E N, I~~((1)n) is a proper subset of I~ ~(l). Then, for every j E IN, for every
l E l, i~~(1) C i~~((1)n) for some n E N, or 1~~(1) - I~~(Í) and ~;ErM`~~~(~) 1'j G
~. l` or i-~(I) J i-~(Í). For every rationing scheme on demand L E L, for~Elry`1~ ~(7) j~ j j
every commodity j E IN, define the set 1~~(L) by I~~(L) -{i E I,y ~ L`j --}-oo}
and define the integer i~~(L) by i~~(L) -~I~ ~(L). The rationing system on
demand is weakly monotonic, i.e., if L, L E L, then, for every j E IN, Lj - L;,
or 1~~(L) - h~(L) and ~,EI,M`1~ ~(L) L~ ~ ~;EIM`I, ~([,) L~, or h~(L) is a proper
subset of h~(L), or h~(L) is a proper subset of 1~~(L). Moreover, let ((L)n)nEN be
a sequence in L converging to some L E L, where, for every j E IN, for every n E N,
I~~((L)n) is a proper subset of I~~(L). Then, for every j E I~r, for every L E L,
i~~(L) C i~~((L)n) for some n E N, or h~(L) - h~(L) and ~~E~M`jt~(L) L`j 1
~tE~M`it~(~) L~, or i~~(L) 1 i~~(L).
The rationing system is weakly monotonic,
i.e., both the rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand is
weakly monotonic. The rationing system of Example 2.2 is not weakly monotonic,
but the rationing systems of Example 2.3, Example 2.4, Example 2.5, and Example
2.6 are weakly monotonic.
- The rationing system on supply is monotonic, i.e., if Í, ! E l, then, for every j E Ih~, !j G lj
or !j ? l~. The rationing system on demand is monotonic, i.e., if L, L E L, then, for
every j E IN, Lj C Lj or Lj ~ Lj. The rationing system is monotoníc, i.e., both
the rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand is monotonic.
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It is easily verified that a monotonic rationing system is weakly monotonic, so the
rationing system of Example 2.2 is not monotonic. The rationing systems of Example
2.3, Example 2.4, Example 2.5, and Example 2.6 are monotonic.
The assumptions that no rationing on supply and no rationing on demand is admissible
and that the rationing system is market independent are so basic, that they hardly can
be considered as assumptions. This is also true for the assumption of connectedness. The
weak monotonicity assumption is also reasonable. This assumption corresponds to the
idea that if two rationing schemes on supply on a market j E IN are given, say l~ and
l~, then the consumers together are allowed to supply less at l~ than at 1„ or l~ - l~, or
the consumers together are allowed to supply more at Í~ than at l~ on market j. Similarly,
if two rationing schemes on demand on a market j E IN are given, say L~ and L„ then
the consumers together are allowed to demand less at L~ than at L„ or L~ - L„ or
the consumers together are allowed to supply more at L~ than at L~ on market j. The
monotonicity assumption is similar, but then for every rationing scheme on demand on a
market j E I„ every consumer is allowed to supply less on market j at l~ than at l~, or
l~ - 1„ or every consumer is allowed to supply more on market j at l~ than at 1~. Similar
remarks apply to monotonic rationing systems on demand.
Not all different rationing schemes are different from the point of view of the consumer.
The following definition captures this idea.
Definition 2.7 (Equivalent rationing schemes)
The rationing scheme on supply l is equivalent to the rationing scheme on supply l, denoted
by l~ l, zf, for every i E I~y, for every j E I,ti~, l'~ 1-w~ implies l'~ - l`~, and 1~ G-w)
implies 1`~ G-w~. The rationing scheme on demand L is equivalent to the rationing scheme
on demand L, denoted by L~ L, if, for every i E I,y, for every j E hr, L~ C w~ - w~
implies L~ - L~, and L~ 1 w~ - w~ implies L~ ~ w~ - w~. The rationing scheme ( l, L) is
equiralerzt to the rationing scheme ( l, L), denoted by (1, L) -r (l, L), if 1 ti l and L ti L.
It is easily verified that the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing schemes on
supply, -)E2'MN, induced by ~, is an equivalence relation, the binary relation on the set of
all possible rationing schemes on demand, )R'M'~, induced by ~, is an equivalence relation,
and the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing schemes, -)ft.`MN x~.}ti~'v,
induced by ~, ís an equivalence relation.
Two equivalent rationing schemes may induce different consumer behaviour. However,
if, for every consumer i E Iiy, ~' is complete, transitive, and convex, and the consumption
set X` is convex, then this is not the case in a constrained equilibrium as is easily verified.
Definition 2.8 (Equivalent rationing systems)
The rationing system on supply 1 is equivalent to the rationing system on supply l, denoted
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by l ~- 1, if, for every l E l, there exists 1 E 1 such that 1~ 1, and for every 1 E l there exists
1 E 1 such that 1~ l. The rationing system on demand L is equivalent to the rationing
system on demand L, denoted by L~ L, if, for every L E L, there exists L E L such that
L~ L, and, for every L E L, there exists L E L such that L~ L. The rationing system
(l, L) is equivalent to the rationing system (1, L), denoted by (1, L) ~(l, L), if both !~ 1
and L ~ L.
It is easily verified that the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing systems on
supply, 2-RtMN, induced by ~-, is an equivalence relation, the binary relation on the set of
all possible rationing systems on demand, 2RfMN, induced by ~, is an equivalence relation,
and the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing systems, 2-RfMN
x 2R}~rN
induced by ~, is an equivalence relation.
3 Rationing Functions
The rationing system on supply is often defined as being the range of a function 1: S-~
-~MN defined on some subset S of RN. Often, S- Rt or S- QN. From now it will
be assumed in this chapter that S- QN. The function 1 is called the rationing function
on supply. For every i E liy, for every j E I~,, component (i - 1)N f j of I is denoted
by h. Moreover, 1' -(li, ..., IN)T, tli E I~y, and 1~ - (h, ..., lM)T , tlj E IN. Given
q E QN, the vector 1'(q) yields a rationing scheme on the supply of consumer i E IM.
Similarly, the rationing system on demand is often defined as being the range of a function
L: Q.v ~~MN called the rationing function on demand. For every i E I,y, for every
j E Inr, component (i - 1)N ~ j of L is denoted by L). Moreover, L' -('Li, .. ., LN)T
and L~ -(L~, ..., L~)T . Given q E Q'N, the vector L'(q) yields a rationing scheme on the
demand of consumer i E I,y. The pair ( l, L) is called a rationing function. Notice that the
image of the rationing function ( 1, L) is a subset of -R~N x R~N
Definition 3.1 (Representation by a rationing function)
The rationing system on supply I is represented by a rationing function on supply 1 íf
l~ 1(QN). The rationing system on demand L is represented by a rationing function on
demand L if L~ L(Q'v). The rationing system (1, L) is represented by a rationing function
(l, L) lf (l, L) ~ (l(QN), L(QN)).
Now some examples of rationing functions are given, representing the rationing systems of
Example 2.2, Example 2.3, Example 2.4, Example 2.5, and Example 2.6, respectively. In
the examples it is assumed that w~ ) 0, `di E I,y, tlj E 1~~, and w E R~~.
Example 3.2 (Unrestricted rationing function)
First, a continuous function hM :[0,1] -~ QM will be constructed. Let f 1 be a path
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from [0,1] into {q E R~ ~~~E~, qi - 1} being surjective. The existence of such a path
f' is guaranteed by a theorem of Peano about the existence of a space-filling curve, see
Armstrong (1983), Section 2.3. It is not difficult to construct a continuous function f2:
{q E Rt ~~~E~, 9i - 1}-~ Q2 being surjective. Then the function f 2 o f' :[0, 1] ~ Q2
is a continuous function being surjective. Using the function f2 o f' it is not difficult to
construct a continuous function g2 :[0, 1] -~ Q2 being surjective and having the additional
property that g2(0) -(0,0)T and g2(1) -(1,1)T. For every n E N`{1,2}, define the
n n-1 n n n-1 q )T q )T yq E Qn-i. Clearly thefunction g : Q -~ Q by g(Q) -(g (ql,..., n-2 i n-1 , ~
function gn is continuous and surjective for every n~ 3. Define the function h' :[0, 1] ~ Q'
by h' (q) - q, tlq E Q' . For every n E N`{ 1}, define the function hn :[0, 1] -~ Qn by
hn(q) - gn(hn''(q)) tlq E[0, 1] . Then the function hn is continuous and surjective for
every n E N.
Let some E E Rtt be given. Notice that if ! is the unrestricted rationing system on supply,
then l~ jj;EiMjj~E~N[rrnn({-w~,...,-wM}) -E,0]. Therefore, the unrestricted rationing
system on supply is represented by the rationing function on supply 1: QN -a -RMN
obtained by defining, for every i E I,y, for every j E IN,
~~(q) - (min({-w~,...,-wM}) -E) h;~(qi), dq E QN.
If L is the unrestricted rationing system on demand, then L~ j~j;EIM jj~EIN [0, w~ ~E]. There-
fore, the unrestricted rationing system on demand is represented by a rationing function
on demand L: QN -~ R`yN obtained by defining, for every i E I~y, for every j E I~r,
L~(q) -(wi ~ E) hM(qi)~ dq E QN.
Example 3.3 (Uniform rationing function)
Let some E E Rt~ be given. The uniform rationing system on supply is represented by
the rationing function on supply l: QN ~-RMN obtained by defining, for every i E I;y,
for every j E In,,
1~(q) -~min({-w~,...,-wM}) - E) q~, `dq E QN.
The uniform rationing system on demand is represented by the rationing function on
demand L: Q'v ~ Rt'v obtained by defining, for every i E I,y, for every j E IN,
LJ(q) -(w~ ~ E) 9;~ d4 E QN.
Example 3.4 (Proportional rationing function)
Assume that w~ 1 0, tli E I1y, t1j E IN. Let some E E Rtt be given. The proportional
rationing system on supply is represented by the rationing function on supply 1: QN -r
-H~MN obtained by defining, for every i E I~y, for every j E IN,
l~(q) --(1 f E)w~4i~ dq E QN-
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The proportional rationing s~'stem on demand is represented by- the rationing function on
demand L: Q~ ~ IRtr ~ obtained by defining, for e~'ery i E I,tir, for e~-ery- j E L~ ,
w
L~(q) - min({ ~r ~, .~~})w~qi,
d4 E Q;~-.
.a.~ . . w~
Example 3.5 (1Tarket share rationing function)
Let some - E Pt} be gi~~en. For e~.er`' j E 1,~ , let numbers g~ 7 0, bi E I,tr. be gi~'en
such that ~,Er~l a~ - 1. The proportional rationing s~'stem on suppl~. ~~'ith respect to
a-(c~~, .... g~f )T is represented by the rationing function on supply 1: Q'~' --a -Rtr'~
obtained b~' defining. for e~'er~~ i E Lir, for e~-er~- j E w..
h(q) - a~ I min `~-a~,....-o,rr 1 I - I q'. ~q E Q~.
For ever~~ j E L~., let numbers ~~ ) 0, t~i E I,tir, be gi~.en such that ~,Et.~f á~ - 1. The
proportional rationing system on demand ~~.ith respect to á-(nl, ..., á.~f )T is representecí
bti. the rationing function on demand L: Q~~~ -~ 1R~r~ obtained by defining, for e~.er~-
i E I,~~. for e~.ert- j E 1,~-.
L~(q) - n
w ~ ~~ q, yq E Q~.
min ~{á .....ájr}~
Example 3.6 (Priority rationing function)
Let some - E 1R}t be gi~'en. For e~.er~- j E l~, let r,~ : I~~ -~ 1~~ be a permutation
specif~~ing the order in ~~~hich consumers are rationed on their suppl~- on the market of
commodit~- j. -hhe priorit~' rationing s~~stem on suppl~- ~~.ith respect to r, -(r, r.. ... rr,~ ) is
represented b~ the rationing furution on suppl~' !: Q~ -~ -]R}f ~ obtained by defining. for
e~'er~- i E 1~r. for e~-er~' j E 1~..
h(q) - ~rnin({-.:J.....-,.;;it}) -~~ max ~{;~~ r(i) -.ll -i llq,.0}~ . t1q E Q~.
For e~-er~' j E I~.. let -, : I~r --~ I~~ be a permutation specif}-ing the order in ~~'hich con-
sumers are rationed on their demand on the marl:et of commodit~~ j. ThP priorit~' rationing
s~'stemon demand ~~-ith respect to- -(wr.....-~.) is represented b~- the rationing function
on demand L: Q~ -~ lf~'~r~ obtained b~- defining, for e~-er~- i E l,tr. for e~-en' j E l~.
L~(q) -(;:~~ ~- e) mas ~{-~ r(i) -.11 t.41q~.0}~ . bq E
Q.v.
Tkre follo~~'ing assumptions are often made ~~~ith respect to the rationing function on suppl~-
Í: Q~ --~ -IR}r'~ and the rationing function on demand L : Q~~ --~ ffZtr'~.
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- It holds that l(1'~~) CC -4:, so there is a rationing scheme on supply equivalent to -oo'y'~~.
For every i E I,tir, L`(1N) ~~ w- w`, so there is a rationing scheme on demand
equivalent to ~oc'ti1',~. It holds that l(On~) - 0`~f'M1~, so full rationing on supply is
admissible, and it holds that L(0'y~) - 0'tif'~~, so full rationing on demand is admissible.
The rationing function on supply is flexible, i.e., 1(0'ti~) - 0'~N and l(1'~~) CC -w. The
rationing function on demand is flexible, i.e., L(0~~) - 0'~N and L`(1`ti~) ~~ u; - w`,
di E I,~.
- The rationing function on supply is market independent, i.e., for every j E I,ti., for every
q,q E Q'N it holds that l~(q) - 1~(q) if q~ - q~. The rationing function on demand
is market independent, i.e., for every q, q E Q'x~, for every j E I,ti., it holds that
Li(q) - Li(4) if q~ - 9~.
- The rationing function on supply is continuous, i.e., the function 1 is continuous. The
rationing function on demand is continuous, i.e., the function L is continuous. Some-
times, the continuity assumption will be replaced by the stronger assumption of
differentiability, w~hich is clearly of a similar nature.
- The rationing function on supply is weakly monotonic, i.e., for every gi, q2 E Q'" , for
every j E I;~-, if q~ G q~, then ~,ErN 1~(q') )~,E~M 1~(qZ). The rationing function on
demand is weakly monotonic, i.e., for every q',q2 E Q'v, for every j E I,ti-, if q~ G q~,
then ~,El,ti, L~(q') G~:E~hr L~(q2). Sometimes the w-eak monotonicity assumption
will be needed in differentiable form. Then it is required that, for every j E Lv,
~;E~~, ae,li(9) G 0, ~ E
Q.~, and ~,E~M a9,Li(4) ~ 0, ~ E
Q.v.
- The rationing function on supply is monotonic, i.e., for every ql, q2 E Q~`~, for every
j E lh-, if q~ G q~, then 1'~(q') ) l'~(q~), tli E I,y, and there exists i' E I:~.~ such
that h~(q') ~ h~(q2). The rationing function on demand is monotonic, i.e., for every
q',q~ E Q~~~, for every j E I,ti-, if q~ G q~, then L'~(q') G L~(q~), yli E L,y, and there
exists i' E I,~~ such that Lj (q' ) G L~ (q~). Sometimes the monotonicity assumption
will be needed in differentiable form. Then it is required that, for every j E I:~,.
aa,h(q) c
O.tif, y9 E Q;~ and Ba,L~(4) 7
O;tf, ~ E Q:v
If an assumption is said to be made with respect to the rationing function (l, L), then it is
meant that this assumption is made both w-ith respect to l and with respect to L.
It is easily verified that all the assumptions mentioned above are satisfied in Example
3.3, Example 3.I, Example 3.5, and Example 3.6, and that all assumptions mentioned
above, except the assumptions concerning the weak monotonicity and the monotonicity of
the rationing function, are satisfied in Example 3.2.
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4 Representation Theorems
The results of this section show that there is an interesting relationship between the as-
sumptions made with respect to the rationing system and the assumptions made with
respect to the rationing function.
Theorem 4.1
Let the rationing system on supply 1 6c represented by the rationing function on supply
l: Qw -~ -1R~t~'". !f l is flexible, then 1 is equivalent to a flexióle rationing system on
supply, if 1 is markef independent, then ! is equiti~alent to a market independent rationing
system on supply, if l is continuous. then 1 is equiL~alent to a closed and connected rationing
system on supply, if l is market independent and weakly monotonic, then 1 is equivalent
to a u;eakly monotonic rationing system on supply, and íf l is market independent and
monotonic, then 1 is equiralent to a monotonic rationing system on supply.
Proof
Let 1 be flexible. Then 1(0'~) - 0~~"- -~ l for some 1 E 1 since I~ l(QN). Vloreover,
I(1'v) CC -w, so -00'1~~~ ~ 1(1N) ~ 1 for some 1 E l, using that l~ 1(Q'"~).
Let l be market independent. Since l~ 1(Q~~), it is sufficient to show that the rationing
system 1(Q~) is market independent. It ~~~ill be show.n that ! E l(Q'v) if and only if h E
h(Q-" ), tfj E I,v, thereby showing the market independence of 1(Q"~). Clearly, ! E!(Q~)
implies h E h(Q~" ), b'j E I;v. Let h E l~(Q,~), b'j E I,v, be gi~-en. For every j E 1;"-, there
exists q~ E Q~ such that h- l1(q~). Define the element q of Q'~~ by q~ - q~, tlj E I,v. Then
1(q) - l by the market independence of l. so 1 E l(Q'" ).
Let l be continuous. Since l~ 1(Q~ ). it is sufficient to show that the rationing system
l(Q'"~) is closed and connected. Since Q~ is compact and connected it follows that l(Q'"')
is compact and connected in -1Rt~~. Therefore, l(Q.v) is also compact and connected in
1R`~r'"~. Since 1(Q'"~) is a compact subset of the Hausdorff space 1R''ti~'" it is closed in II~.'tr'"..
Let ! be market independent and ~~~eakly monotonic. Since l ~- 1(Q~~), it is sufficient to
show that f(Q"~) is weakly monotonic. Let l,l E 1(Q'"~) be gi~~en and let q,q E Q'~` be such
that l- I(q) and 1- l(q). Clearlv. for e~-er~- j E I,v, h ~~ -x~r and h~~ -oo'ti1. For
e~-ery j E I~-, if q~ - g~, then h- l,, since ! is market independent, and if, without loss of
generality, q~ C q~, then ~,E~.N l`~ ~~,Er,r (f by the weak monotonicity of l.
Let l be market independent and monotonic. Since l-~ l(Q'"~), it is sufficient to show that
l(Q" ) is monotonic. Let l, l E I(Q~ ) be gi~-en and let q, q E Q'"~ be such that l- 1(q) and
1- l(q). For every j E 1,~., if q~ - q~. then h- h since 1 is market independent, and if,
~cithout loss of generality, q~ C q~. then l~ ] h by the monotonicity of l. Q.E.D.
The proof for the results given in Theorem f.2 concerning the rationing system on demand
is similar to the proof of the corresponding results concerning the rationing system on
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supply gi~-en in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2
Let the rationing system on demand L be represented by the rationing function on denzand
L: Q~~~ -~ 1Rt~~~. If L is flezible, then L is equiaalent to a fiexible rationing system on de-
mand, if L is ntarket independent, then L is equivalent to a market independent ration.ing
system on dernand. rJ~ L is continuous, then L is equiz;alent to a closed and connected ra-
tioning system on demand, if L is market independent and weakly monotonic, then L is
equivalent to a u~eakly monotonic rationing system on demand, and if L is market inde-
pendent and rnonotonic. tlaen L is equivalent to a monotonic rationing system on demand.
The follo~~.ing t~co results gi~~e a converse of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.3
Let the rationing system on supply 1 be fleaible, market independent, closed, and connected.
If the rationing system on supply ! is weakly monotonic, then 1 can be represented 6y
a,flezible, market independent, continuous, and weakly monotonic rationing function on
supply. !f the rationing system on supply 1 is monotonic, then 1 can be represented by a
fleaible, market independent, corztinuous, and monotonic rationing function on supply.
Proof
Let 1 be ~~~eakl~- monotonic. A rationing function on supply l: Q'v --~ -1R~}f ~~ ~~-ith the
desired properties ~~-ilí be constructed. Since 1 is market independent it holds that there
exist subsets l,. dj E 1~.. of -1R~tir~`~ such that 1 E I if and onlv if h E f~, f1j E!,`-. Let some
j' E I,r. be gi~~en. For e~-ery h~ E h~, let the set I-"`(h~) be defined b5. I-x(h~) -{i E I~z ~
l'~, --x} and let the integer i-~(1~~) be defined by~ i-~(lz~) -~I-o"(h~). Let the set lí
be gieen b~- Ií -{k E Iof ~~h~ E Iz~, i-"(h~) - k}. Since l is flexible, it holds that 0 E lí
and -lI E!í. For e~-er~- k E lí `{.1I}, let a(k) E-íR~ be defined bv
aÍ Á ) - SUp ~~ ~iElt.f~1-~(~t~)17'
h~ E Iz~ and i-~(h~) - k}~ .
Clearlc. a(0) - 0. Let rr be an increasing function from I~h into Iti. ~otice that r is
uniquely deterrninecl. -(1) - 0, and w(~Lí )-.~~I.




tr-S , Ns E ( ~, cr].
1}tr-9
Notice that f'(a) - 0. Obviously. the inverse of fa (fá)-1 :[0,1] -~ {s E Il3' ~ s G a}, is
defined b~.
- ( fa)-1(t) - tta t; 1 t~t E[~, 1),
(fa)-1(11) - -x.
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C1Parly, if (s")nEr is a sequence in {s E 1R' ~ s G a} and sn converges to some s E
{s E 1R' ~ s C a}, then the sequence (fa(sn))nE~; converges to fa(s). Therefore, fa is a
continuous function. Similarly, it can be shown that (fa)-' is a continuous function.
`ow a continuous. injective, and surjective function g is constructed such that with every
!~- E h~ a real number of [0, 1] is associated. This is achieved by subdividing the unit
inten-al in ~lí - 7-' (.1~I ) pieces and constructing the function g such that, for every
l, E l- with l~ -x.tir l) E(,~-~('-x(~,~))-i '-'(~-~`(~,-)) ). while ! l E l ~a-ith7 i i~ , 9( ~ n-~(.ar)-r -- (tr)-i ~,~ 7, 7,







~r-~(,L1) - 1 ~ ~r-'(M) - 1
, tll), E !7, ` {-x'Lr}.
rr ' 0 1 0~~ - ( ) -
9(~' )- ~r-'(M) - 1~ a-'(lll) - 1 -
0.
`ow it is shown that g is continuous. Let ((!7~)")nEr be a sPquence in h~ converging
to some l)~ E 17~. Suppose the sequence (g((!7~)n))nEr does not converge to g(h~). From
the continuity of fo(~), t1k E lí ~{a1}, and since i-""(l)~) --11 implies h~ --x~~,
it follows that if i-~((l)~)n) - i-~(h~). Hn E N, then g((h-)n) --~ g(h~), a contradic-
tion with the supposition that (g((h~)n))~EN does not com-erge to g(h~). Consequentl~,
~~-ithout loss of generality, i-x((h~)n) ~ i-~`(h~), b'n E I`. From the weak monotonic-
it~- of l it follows that. for every n E 1~, I-x((l)~)") is a proper subset of I-~(l)~) or
1-~(l)~) is a proper subset of I-~((h-)n). ~~'ithout loss of generalitv, since (h~)n ---~ l)-,
it holds that, for every- n E N, I-~((1~~)") is a proper subset of I-~"(h-), and, moreover,
C" -~ -x. If r,-'(i-~((l ~~)n)) - r-'(i-x~(l,,)) - I. t1n E l~, then, since l is
~~Er.tt`r-"((~,~)") I~ 7
market independent and weakly monotonic. it follows that ~,Ertr`r-r(f ,) 1'~, - a(i-~(h~))
and, since ~,Er~,`r-x((~ ,)") l`~~ -~ -oc, it follo~as that
9((l)~)") - -, i -' 11 1
~
~-~(i-~(~7 )) - 2 ~ .f~(~-~((~,~)n))(~iEr.~r~r-x((~~,)") ~1~)
rr (:~1)-1 r (- )-
a-'(i-o`(I7,)) - 1
;r-'(.lI) - 1
r-,(i-~(i~,)) - 1 fo(,-~(~,,))(~(~-~"(l,-))) - 1)
- ~r-i(a1) - 1 ~ r-r(.11) - 1 - 9( i' ,
a contradiction with the supposition that ( g((l)~)n))„E~; does not com.erge to g(l)~). Conse-
quentlv. without loss of generality, for every n E N. I-x((l)~)n) C 1-~`(1~~) and rr-r(i-~((h~)n)) G
r,-'(i-x(l)~)) - 1. 50, there exists an element l)~ E l)~ with i-~(h~) ~ i-~((17~)"), `dn E N,
1-1
and i-'x(h~} C i-~(h~). lising that l is market independent, this leads to a contradictíon
to the weak monotonicity of l. Consequently, g is a continuous function.
It will be shown that h~ is connected in R"'~. Suppose h~ is not connected in R'M, then
there exist two disjoint, non-empty subsets of h~, say 1~~ and h~, both being open in h~
and whose union equals h~. Obviously, the sets Il x~.. x h~-1 x h~ x h~~i x... x 1N. and
I1 x... x lJ~-1 x h~ x h~tl x.. . x 1N are t.wo disjoint, non-empty subsets of jj~Ew l„ both
being open in j-j~E~N l~, contradicting the connectedness of 1. Consequently, l~~ is connected
i n R' 1~
Since the function g is continuous and h~ is connected in R"y it follows that g(h~) is con-
nected in [0, 1] and hence an interval. Clearly, 0'h~ E h~ and -ao'~ E h~ since l is flexible
and market independent. Since g(0'tir) - 0 and g(-oo't~) - 1 it follows that g is surjective.
Next it is shown that g is injective. Suppose g is not injective, then there exists h~, h~ E h~
such that l~~ ~ l~~ and g(l~~) - g(l~~). From the definition of g it follows that i-~(1~~) -
i-~(1~~) and ~;E~M`~-,~li ,~ l~~ -~~E~M`I-~ll~,~ ~~'~ This yields a contradiction to the weak
monotonicity of l. Consequently g is injective.
It is easily verified that the topological spaces QM and R'~ are homeomorphic. Therefore,
a set closed in R'M is also compact in R"~. Since l is closed in R'M~~, it follows easily
from the market independence that h~ is closed in R"ti~, hence compact in R''t~. Since h~ is
a compact topological space, [0,1] is a Hausdorff space, and g: l~~ -~ [0,1] is a continuous,
injective, and surjective function, it follows that g is a homeomorphism, so g-' :[0, 1] -~ 1~~
is a continuous function. Let the function h:[0, 1] -~ h~ be defined by h- g-1.
The function h would represent h~ if its image is a subset of -R'~f . The function h will
now be modified in order to guarantee this.
When lí -{O..I~I}, then there exists t E(0, 1) such that, for e~~ery t E [t. 1]; h,(t) G-wJ~,
di E 1.~~. Let the function 1~~ : Q~~ --a -R}~ be defined by
h'(9) - h(tqi')~ d9 E Q~~ -
`ow consider the case that {0.:11} is a proper subset of Ií. By the weak monotonicity of
l there exists a uniquely determined proper subset 1 of 1,1~ such that i-~(1~~) - ~r(2) for
some h~ E 1~~ implies 1-x(h~) - 1. Since the set [0, „- ~-r~f~-i] is compact and h,(t) 7 -x,
tli E I,~i `1, t1t E[0. „- ,~ ti!~-,], it holds that, for e~-ery i E 1;11 `I, the continuous function
h, has a minimum on [0, x-,~~f,-1]. say a'. For e~-ery i E I,~r `1, let the real number á' be
defined by a- min( {n', -~a~,}) - 1. For every i E 1,~ ~ 1, let the function h, : Q'ti~ --~ -Rt
be defined by
h~(q) - max({á ,h,(4~')}), d9 E Q~~. (1)
i`;otice that, for every i E I,y `Í, for every q E Q'~~,
~~~(9) - h~(qi'), if 9~' E [~~ „-~(M)-i]' (2)
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and, moreover,
hi(qi') 7 -w~, implies h,(q) - hi(4i'), and h;(qi') G -w~, implies l`~,(q) G-~
Let t E ( 0. ,~-,~,'y~-i) be such that, for every i E I,
. (3)
h;(t) G ~~ ~ á' ~ min ~{0, -wl,}) , `dt E [t, 1]. (4)
~ET,y`Í
`~otice that such a real number t exists since h is continuous and h;(t) --oo, f1i E I,
b't E[,,-,~y~-1, 1]. Let q be any element of Q'v such that q~~ - t. tiotice that, for every
i E I, h;(t) G -w'~,, b't E [t, 1]. For every i E I, let the function h, : Q'~' -~ -1R~ be defined
bv
h~(q) - h~(9~'), Hq E QN with q~, G t,
~~~(q) - hi(~ f t- 9i' ~ ~r ~~EIM`i ~h'(q) - h~(q)) , b'q E QN with q~~ 1 t.
:~Totice that, for every i E Í, 1~, is continuous and, using ( 4), for every q E Q~ with q~~ ~ t,
h~(q) - h;(iÍ t t - q~~ ~~i ~ ~li'(q) - h'(q)~
~El~y`I
G ~i ~ á` ~-
min ({0, -w~,}~ - ~1 ~ l~'(q) C -w~,,
~E I,y `Í ~E I,N `!
~~-here for the last inequality (1) is used.
Lsing the pre~-ious t~i~o paragraphs, a rationing function on supply l: Q'~~ -~ -1Rtt'~. is
constructed. Using (3) and (5) it follo~~.s easily that ! is represented by l. Ob~-iously, l is
flexible. market independent, and continuous. Let q', qz E Q',' be such that q~, G q~, G t.
t;sing (2) and the construction of h it follows that
~ l,~(9~) - ~ hi(q;-) ~ ~ hi(q~-) - ~ h-(q~).
iEl,ti iET,ti~ iEl,u iEl,y
Let qi,q2 E Q:v be such that t G q~, C q~,. Then
~ 1~~(9~) - ~ ~~'(41) ~ ~ ~hi(`1 f t - q~'~ ~ ~ ~t ~ ( l~'(4) - l~-(ql)~
iEltif iEl.tt`I iEl iEl ~El,y`Í
-~~h;(t~ f t- 4~~~ f ~ l,'(9)
iE! iElfy`(





Let qr, q2 E Q'~ be such that q~, c t c qz, and q~, C q~,. Then the two cases considered above
immediately vield that ~,Et.u I'~~(qr) )~,E~.,, l`~,(4z). Therefore ! is ~ti.eakly monotonic. So,
l satisfies all the desired properties.
`ext. let 1 be a monotonic rationing system on supply. Let some j' E I,~~ be given.
Construct the continuous, injective, and surjective function h: [0, 1] --. h~ as in the first
part of the proof and, for a E 1R. let the function f" :{s E)R~ ~ s L a} ~(0, 1] be
defined as before. For every i E l~r. let cY' - min({-w~,,0}) - 1 and let the function
g' :-1Rt ~[a' - 1, 0] be defined bv
g'(s) - a` - fo(s - a'), b's E-1Rt `(a', 0] ,
g`(s) - s, b's E [a',0].
Let the function h~ : Q'ti~ --~ -1R~ be defined by
h'(q) - ~91 (hr(qi')) , ... ~ga~ (hn-r(9~'))~T ~ d4 E Q~ ~
In this way a rationing function on supply !: QN -i -1R'~ h' is constructed. It is easily
verified that ! is represented by ! and that ! is flexible, market independent, continuous,
and monotonic. Q.E.D.
The proof for the results concerning the rationing system on demand given in Theorem 4.4
is similar.
Theorem 4.4
Let the rationing system on demand L 6e fiexióle, market independent, closed, and con-
nected. !f the rationing system on dem.and L is weakly monotonic, then L can 6e represented
by a flerible, market independent. continuous, and u~eakly monotonic rationing funetion on
demand. If the rationing system on demand L is monotonic, then L can be represented by
a fieiible, market ~independent, continuous, and monotonic rationing Junction on dernand.
The results of this section show that the set of admissible rationing schemes can be de-
scribed equall~. well by means of a rationing system as by a rationing function and provide
necessarv and sufficient conditions that make a representation possible.
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On the notion of altruism
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682 Drs. B. Kamp
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Communicated by Prof.dr. S.H. Tijs
689 G. Facchini, F. van Megen, P. Borm and S. Tijs
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